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Abstract. Medical terminology collects and organizes the many different kinds of 
terms employed in the biomedical domain both by practitioners and also in the 
course of biomedical research. In addition to serving as labels for biomedical 
classes, these names reflect the organizational principles of biomedical vocabularies 
and ontologies. Some names represent invariant features (classes, universals) of 
biomedical reality (i.e., they are a matter for ontology). Other names, however, con-
vey also how this reality is perceived, measured, and understood by health profes-
sionals (i.e., they belong to the domain of epistemology). We analyze terms from 
several biomedical vocabularies in order to throw light on the interactions between 
ontological and epistemological components of these terminologies. We identify 
four cases: 1) terms containing classification criteria, 2) terms reflecting detectabil-
ity, modality, uncertainty, and vagueness, 3) terms created in order to obtain a com-
plete partition of a given domain, and 4) terms reflecting mere fiat boundaries. We 
show that epistemology-loaded terms are pervasive in biomedical vocabularies, that 
the “classes” they name often do not comply with sound classification principles, 
and that they are therefore likely to cause problems in the evolution and alignment 
of terminologies and associated ontologies. 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Biomedical terminology 
 
The purpose of biomedical terminology is to collect the names of substances, qualities and 
processes employed in the biomedical domain both by practitioners and in the course of 
biomedical research. Biomedical terminology reflects not only the various subspecialties of 
biomedicine (roughly corresponding to specialized subdomains or dimensions of biomedi-
cal reality), but also the many purposes for which terminologies are developed. Specialized 
terminologies include SNOMED CT1 for clinical medicine, the Foundational Model of 
Anatomy2 for anatomical structures, the International Statistical Classification of Diseases 
and Related Health Problems3 (or International Classification of Diseases, for short) for 
health disorders, the Current Procedural Terminology4 for medical procedures, and the 
                                                 
1 http://www.snomed.org/ 
2 http://fma.biostr.washington.edu/ 
3 http://www.who.int/whosis/icd10/ 
4 http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/3113.html 
 Gene Ontology™5 for molecular biology. Most terminologies were originally developed to 
serve a particular purpose. The Medical Subjects Headings6 (MeSH) is the controlled vo-
cabulary used for indexing the biomedical literature at the US National Library of Medi-
cine, a purpose analogous to that of the Gene Ontology, which is used to ‘annotate’ (char-
acterize, index) genes and gene products. The very names of some terminologies reflect 
their purpose clearly. This is the case, for example, of the Alternative Billing Concepts 
terminology. The International Classification of Diseases (ICD-9-CM) evolved out of a 
terminology for compiling mortality and morbidity statistics but now constitutes a con-
trolled vocabulary used by the insurance industry for reporting claims. We show that in 
many cases biomedical terms are crafted not only for naming the classes of entities found in 
biomedical reality, but also to represent additional information. In this paper, we are par-
ticularly interested in the intrusion of epistemology into biomedical terminology. 
 
 
1.2 Terms as names for biomedical classes 
 
It is often said that there is nothing that cannot be encountered in the domain of medicine. 
Deviations are everywhere. Thus anatomy as described in textbooks corresponds to canoni-
cal anatomy; it represents some kind of idealized structure to which no actual human body 
fully corresponds. It is essentially impossible to describe disease manifestations without 
resorting not only to lists of associated signs and symptoms but also to the frequency distri-
butions of the latter for each particular disease. In addition to the most common, prototypi-
cal form of the disease, there are many clinical variants in which some of the common 
manifestations are missing and other, less frequent manifestations take their place. 
In this context of high variability, it is not surprising that names are crafted to represent 
not only the prototypical classes but also the many possible variants. Thus names are 
formed that include information identifying specific clinical variants, or information about 
associated lesions or injuries. The default assumption on the part of those working with, 
and on, terminologies, is that such specially crafted terms correspond to classes of entities 
found in biomedical reality in just the same sense as do more straightforward terms such as 
meningitis or fever.  
This assumption takes many forms, and on the weakest possible reading it consists in 
the thesis that every term used in clinical practice or in biomedical research is ipso facto to 
be accepted as designating a corresponding ‘class’ or ‘concept’ – whereby the correspond-
ing classes or concepts are then not always conceived as existing on the side of entities in 
reality but rather as being themselves linguistic entities, correlates of the terms with which 
they are associated. In what follows, however, we will provide evidence to the effect that 
only some types of variant terms represent classes (universals) in reality, and that others are 
in fact disguised assertions about such genuine classes which are formulated as terms 
merely in order to meet current practical requirements of coding. 
Genuine classes are supposed to reflect the categorization principles proposed by 
Rosch [5] and Tversky [8]. They define resemblance between categories as maximizing the 
sum of all the common features within a category minus the sum of the measures of all of 
the distinctive features. Categories must also reflect the perceived world structure. 
 
 
                                                 
5 http://geneontology.org/ 
6 http://www.nlm.nih.gov/mesh/ 
 1.3 Ontology vs. epistemology 
 
Ontology, for the biomedical informatics purposes which are of concern to us here, 
starts out from the idea that there are invariants in reality – here called ‘classes’ or ‘univer-
als’ – which are captured in the general terms used in the textbooks of biological science 
and which are instantiated by particular examples or cases of such classes, whether these be 
organisms or organism parts, qualities, functions, processes, diseases or symptoms. Ontol-
ogy is then the study of such classes and of the relations between them, for example of the 
is_a relation which obtains between two classes when it is a matter of scientific law that all 
instances of the first class are instances of the second, or the part_of relation which obtains 
between two classes when it is a matter of scientific law that instances of the first exist al-
ways as parts of instances of the second. 
Epistemology in the strict sense is the study of how cognitive subjects come to know 
the truth about given phenomena in reality – for example that they instantiate given classes 
or universals. In the sense that is relevant to our present purposes here, epistemology is the 
study of biological or medical knowledge. Thus it encompasses the ways in which physi-
cians come to know about the existence of given diseases in given patients.  
In this paper, we examine the degree to which biomedical terms are created to repre-
sent not instances or classes in reality but rather features reflecting our knowledge or igno-
rance of such instances or classes. We identify four such cases for which we present exam-
ples drawn from medical vocabularies: 1) terms containing classification criteria, 2) terms 
reflecting detectability, modality, uncertainty, and vagueness, 3) terms created in order to 
obtain a complete partition of a given domain, and 4) terms reflecting mere fiat boundaries. 
 
 
2 Terms containing classification criteria 
 
Compound biomedical terms are often generated from simpler terms by adding qualifiers 
representing classification criteria. In many cases, such specially created variant terms do 
not represent classes of entities in reality which are distinct from the classes represented by 
the corresponding root terms: rather, they represent the same underlying reality but ex-
pressed in slightly different ways. Sometimes, variant terms do not make ontological sense 
at all: they do not represent special classes in reality but are rather such as to convey other 
sorts of information. In other cases, however, variant terms do refer to corresponding 
classes, and to classes which are distinct from those referred to by the underlying root 
terms. For example where the presence or absence of a manifestation is a key element for 
distinguishing between different diseases or different forms of a disease. 
 
 
2.1 Variation 
 
Let us take febrile seizure and afebrile seizure to illustrate ontologically valid variants. 
(Febrile in this context means ‘fever-related’.) Seizures occur when the normal pattern of 
neuronal activity becomes disturbed, causing convulsions (among other things). While sei-
zures are one possible manifestation of epilepsy, they are also common in young children 
exposed to fever (e.g., after receiving immunization shots). Seizures occurring in the con-
text of fever in children are called febrile seizures. They can be thought of as a transient 
overreaction of brain neurons to fever and are distinct from afebrile seizures where an un-
derlying inherent condition (e.g., a brain lesion) may cause the seizures. Here, taking ac-
count of the presence or absence of a manifestation (fever) in the name of a disorder re-
flects an ontologically valid distinction as the two kinds of seizures are distinct in their ori-
 gin and also have a different prognosis and treatment. Note however that while afebrile sei-
zure is a term which serves its epistemological purpose in distinguishing seizure with un-
derlying inherent cause from seizure triggered solely by fever, it can be objected to the 
given term that it does not capture the (positive) essence or nature of the disease in ques-
tion, which might more properly be called precisely: seizure with underlying inherent 
cause. 
A similar phenomenon can be observed outside the domain of disorders. Before the re-
cent era of molecular biology, the identification of micro-organisms relied (and still does in 
many cases rely) on extrinsic (phenotypic) rather than intrinsic (genotypic) characteristics. 
Besides shape (coccus, rod, spiral), one of the most important criteria for identifying bacte-
ria is Gram stain, which is based on the reactions of a bacteria sample upon exposure to 
crystal violet dye. Gram-positive bacteria (e.g., Staphylococcus aureus) appear purple 
brown under microscopic examination, while Gram-negative bacteria (e.g., Escherichia 
coli) do not. Gram staining is based on the ability of the bacteria cell wall to retain the crys-
tal violet dye during solvent treatment. While this criterion clearly refers to an identifica-
tion technique (i.e., how we acquire knowledge about given bacteria), the division between 
Gram-positive and Gram-negative bacteria does in fact correspond to a division in nature 
on the side of bacteria themselves. The cell walls of Gram-positive microorganisms have a 
higher peptidoglycan and lower lipid content than do those of Gram-negative bacteria, and 
this gives the bacteria themselves specific properties (e.g., sensitivity to some antibiotics). 
In other words, Gram stain reveals differences in constitutional characteristics of bacteria 
that were simply not known – but were present – when the Danish physician Gram discov-
ered this property in the nineteenth century. This does not, however, imply that the distinc-
tion between Gram-positive and Gram-negative bacteria corresponds to a distinction be-
tween two classes of bacteria. 
 
 
2.2 Conjunction 
 
Here is a completely different case. Tuberculosis is an infectious disease caused by 
Mycobacterium tuberculosis. Although the lungs are most commonly affected, the bacteria 
may also infect other organs, including the adrenal glands. The name for the corresponding 
location-based subtype of the disease is Tuberculosis of the adrenal glands. Tests are used 
to diagnose the infection, including direct identification under a microscope and culture of 
infected fluids. This background helps understand the presence in the medical vocabulary 
(ICD-9-CM) of a term such as  
 
Tuberculosis of adrenal glands, tubercle bacilli not found (in sputum) by microscopy, 
but found by bacterial culture. 
 
This term is in fact not the name of a special class at all. Rather, it is a sentence-schema, of 
the form: 
 
 [is an instance of] Tuberculosis of adrenal glands whereby tubercle bacilli were not 
found (in sputum) by microscopy but rather by bacterial culture, 
 
and formatted as if it were a class name for coding purposes. For of course the fact of posi-
tive or negative identification of Mycobacterium tuberculosis by microscopic examination 
of bodily fluids does not change the disease in any way (it changes neither the correspond-
ing disease class nor the instances by which this class is instantiated). It simply provides 
information about how a physician obtained knowledge about the disease. This is an exam-
ple of an epistemological criterion (how the disease was diagnosed) that is introduced into a 
terminology that is otherwise used for classification purposes. 
 Closely related to the previous example are many cases where the presence of associ-
ated manifestations, lesions, or injuries are used to define classes. Consider terms such as: 
 
 Closed skull fracture without intracranial injury 
 Open skull fracture without intracranial injury 
 Closed skull fracture with intracranial injury 
 Open skull fracture with intracranial injury 
 
A fracture of the skull may be open (when the broken bone penetrates the skin) or closed. A 
fracture of the skull can in either case also be associated with intracranial injury. The pres-
ence of skin penetration by the fractured bone need not imply a different sort of fracture, 
but it does imply a change in the total disease phenomenon of which the fracture forms a 
part. For example, open fractures are more likely to get infected, due to the breach created 
in the skin barrier. Here, skin penetration has a direct and predictable consequence on the 
evolution of the fracture. Therefore, the term open fracture represents more than the simple 
conjunction of a fracture and skin laceration occurring at different locations and the pres-
ence or absence of skin penetration by the fractured bone is, therefore, a classification crite-
rion that is valid from the point of view of ontology. 
In contrast, the presence of concomitant intracranial injury does not change the fracture 
itself and, therefore, a fracture without intracranial injury does not differ from the fracture 
when taken alone. The presence of intracranial injury may indeed affect the prognosis of 
that fracture, making a fracture of the skull with intracranial injury worse than an isolated 
fracture. On the other hand, a brain concussion (i.e., a head trauma without fracture) with 
intracranial injury might have the same prognosis as a skull fracture with intracranial in-
jury. Thus, there is no ontological difference between a skull fracture and a skull fracture 
without intracranial injury. Where a skull fracture with intracranial injury is most properly 
conceived as a conjunction of a skull fracture and a (possibly related) intracranial injury, 
the term Skull fracture without intracranial injury merely conveys the information that the 
presence of possible intracranial injury in the context of a skull fracture has been ade-
quately checked and ruled out. The added precision brought by this latter term therefore 
relates to what is known about a given case of skull fracture rather than to the reality of the 
fracture itself. 
Although affecting primarily the subdomain of disorders (e.g., Gallbladder calculus 
without mention of cholecystitis, Tuberculin skin test reactor without active tuberculosis), 
this phenomenon is also encountered with procedures (e.g., Adenoidectomy without tonsil-
lectomy, Repair of malunion of humerus without graft). 
 
 
3 Terms reflecting detectability, modality, uncertainty, and vagueness 
 
3.1 Detectability 
 
Many diseases start with a latent phase. Tumors often grow from a single cell in which the 
functions regulating cell proliferation have been altered. At this early stage, most tumors 
are not detectable by the techniques currently available. It often takes months if not years 
before the tumor has grown large enough that its presence becomes apparent to, say, a radi-
ologist. Similarly, the diagnosis of diseases, abnormalities, and manifestations is sometimes 
fortuitous: they may be discovered either by chance or during an investigation focused on 
other, quite different matters. Some special terms, now, are coined to mark the way in 
which a disease is discovered. Thus an asymptomatic cholelithiasis names a condition – the 
presence of gallstones – whose diagnosis is made when gallstones are discovered during an 
abdominal ultrasound, CT scan, or X-Ray exam prescribed for another problem (e.g., the 
 presence of blood in urine) and in the absence of symptoms of cholelithiasis (e.g., jaun-
dice).  
Along the same lines, a subclinical seizure is a seizure that can be detected by EEG, 
but has no clinical manifestations. These examples illustrate what we call “threshold 
classes”, i.e., classes created for the purpose of representing the early stage or a milder 
form of a disease. In this case, although inevitably emphasizing how the physician came to 
discover the disease, detectability essentially represents the severity of the disease, the dis-
ease classes below some detection threshold often representing milder forms. Such class 
terms are ontologically valid in the same way in which, for example, embryo or fetus are 
ontologically valid class terms in biology. (They represent phase sortals [10].) They corre-
spond to a partition of the domain of diseases along the dimension of severity. Because in 
the prototypical case diseases are for obvious reasons above some threshold of detectabil-
ity, the partitioning of diseases by severity is however largely incomplete. 
 
 
3.2 Modality 
 
The presence of modality indicators in medical terms is a completely different issue. Take 
for example the following three terms for an abscess of the ovary and Fallopian tube:  
 
 Definite tubo-ovarian abscess 
 Probable tubo-ovarian abscess 
 Possible tubo-ovarian abscess. 
 
Here, definite, probable, and possible clearly refer to modality, not detectability. In other 
words, these qualifiers reflect the confidence of the physician at the time the diagnosis is 
posed, i.e., an epistemological feature that does not reflect the nature or severity of the dis-
ease being diagnosed. Here again, because of the uncertainty inherent to the diagnostic 
process, such features are found mostly in the subdomain of diseases. Other examples of 
terms exhibiting modality markers include: 
 
 Diseases of possible viral origin 
 Probable suicide 
 Basal cell tumor, uncertain whether benign or malignant 
 Diarrhea of presumed infectious origin.  
 
In some cases, terms even reflect the degree of confidence a physician has towards several 
alternative possible diagnoses:  
 
 Atypical squamous cells of uncertain significance, probably benign 
 Atypical squamous cells of uncertain significance, probably malignant 
 Atypical squamous cells of uncertain significance suggestive of an intraepithelial 
lesion. 
 
These examples present a particularly clear form of a phenomenon seen in almost all bio-
medical terminologies, namely the expression via single terms of information which should 
more properly be conveyed in the form of complete sentences. 
 
 
3.3 Vagueness, underspecification, and other hedges. 
 
Vagueness is frequently encountered in medicine, and it is frequently important (for exam-
ple for legal reasons) that clinical coding systems capture vagueness in explicit fashion in 
their constituent terms. Once again, however, we should beware of drawing ontological 
conclusions from the existence of terms of given sorts.  
 Vagueness arises for example in the presence of preliminary or incomplete diagnosis, 
but it is present for many other reasons also. Many class names exhibit underspecification 
markers such as unspecified and not otherwise specified (abbreviated NOS). Examples of 
such terms include: 
 
 Open fracture of unspecified cervical vertebra  
 Concussion with loss of consciousness of unspecified duration 
 Replacement of unspecified heart valve  
 Poisoning by unspecified drug or medicinal substance 
 Colostomy, not otherwise specified  
 Chemical element, NOS.  
 
In the examples above, unspecified cervical vertebra refers to one of the seven cervical ver-
tebrae and unspecified heart valve refers to the mitral, tricuspid, aortic, or pulmonary heart 
valve. Further specification for colostomy could be in terms of permanence (permanent vs. 
temporary) or localization (transverse colostomy vs. sigmoidostomy). 
Markers expressing vagueness and other types of hedges are pervasive in biomedical 
vocabularies [3]. The issue here is not so much the existence of vagueness but rather how 
vagueness is represented. Going back to the examples above, there might well be circum-
stances where it is not known which of the four heart valves was replaced. In this case, the 
valve replaced simply needs to be referred to as heart valve and there is no need to creating 
a spurious class term such as unspecified heart valve. Similarly, in the absence of further 
information about the permanence or localization of a colostomy, every particular instance 
of colostomy still shares the characteristics common to colostomies in general (i.e., it is an 
artificial opening from the colon on the abdomen wall). Thus the class Colostomy, not oth-
erwise specified, too, shares all the characteristics of the class Colostomy – but it has no 
additional characteristics either. Not otherwise specified expresses the – quite trivial – fact 
that further information could be gained but is not currently available about this particular 
instance. Thus again, it is an epistemological rather than an ontological feature which is 
here expressed. 
 
 
4 Terms created in order to obtain a complete partition of the domain 
 
Medical terminologies such as the International Classification of Diseases (ICD) aim at 
providing a coding system for all possible health problems. In other words, ICD sets out to 
provide a complete partition of the domain of health problems. At the same time however it 
also aims to be as concise as possible, offering only of the order of 20,000 classification 
slots (i.e., nodes in the classification tree), which means that it is impossible to represent 
even all standard forms of diseases, let alone their clinical variants. The trade-off adopted 
by the World Health Organization in developing ICD is to provide slots for the most fre-
quent problems (corresponding essentially to genuine biological classes), while reserving 
part of the 20,000 slots to groupings of the less frequent diseases (corresponding to its own 
rules of thumb for constructing artificial classes) by means of terms involving ‘other’. 
Let us examine, for example, the representation of Cystic fibrosis in ICD-10. As illus-
trated in Table 1, this class has four subclasses. Cystic fibrosis with pulmonary manifesta-
tions and Cystic fibrosis with intestinal manifestations correspond to two frequent clinical 
forms of cystic fibrosis. Cystic fibrosis, unspecified is another example of a class whose 
name exhibits underspecification markers (see 3.3 above). Cystic fibrosis with other mani-
festations is created for the purpose of representing those clinical forms not covered by the 
first two cases (e.g., cystic fibrosis which affects the reproductive system) and thus to com-
plete the classification at minimal cost in extra terminological resources. 
 Table 1 – Cystic fibrosis in ICD-10 
E84 Cystic fibrosis 
E84.0 Cystic fibrosis with pulmonary manifestations 
E84.1 Cystic fibrosis with intestinal manifestations 
E84.8 Cystic fibrosis with other manifestations 
E84.9 Cystic fibrosis, unspecified 
 
The issue with such artificial classes created in order to obtain a complete partition of a 
given domain even though the number of classificatory slots is limited is that their defini-
tions are relative to (and thus vary with changes in definitions of) other classes. Thus for 
example the instances of Cystic fibrosis with other manifestations are instances of Cystic 
fibrosis that are instances of neither Cystic fibrosis with pulmonary manifestations nor Cys-
tic fibrosis with intestinal manifestations. Such terminological practice brings instabilities 
also in the sense that if a new ‘with … manifestations’ subclass of cystic fibrosis is intro-
duced at some later stage in addition to the with pulmonary manifestations and with intesti-
nal manifestations subclasses, then the meaning and extension of Cystic fibrosis with other 
manifestations will itself change even though the term itself remains the same. 
It often occurs that a plurality of clinical vocabularies all define what is purported to be 
the same class but in ways which make their respective definitions relative to the defini-
tions of other classes provided within the corresponding host vocabulary. As a conse-
quence, the putatively identical classes in the separate vocabularies are subject to a spuri-
ous differentiation of a sort which blocks alignment of the data coded in their terms. For 
example, Clinical Terms Version 3 (CTV3) also represents Cystic fibrosis, but its sub-
classes, shown in Table 2, are slightly different from those of ICD. 
Table 2 – Cystic fibrosis in Clinical Terms V. 3 
C370 Cystic fibrosis 
C3702 Cystic fibrosis with pulmonary manifestations 
C3703 Cystic fibrosis with intestinal manifestations 
C3700 Cystic fibrosis with no meconium ileus 
XaBDb Cystic fibrosis with other manifestations 
C370z Cystic fibrosis NOS 
 
All subclasses present in ICD are also present in CTV3, but CTV3 has an extra subclass: 
Cystic fibrosis with no meconium ileus. If we assume for the purpose of this demonstration 
that this additional subclass is ontologically valid, then its instances will be included in 
Cystic fibrosis with other manifestations in ICD but not in CTV3. 
Terms like Cystic fibrosis with other manifestations are examples of a quite general 
phenomenon: because they are introduced simply in order to complete a partition they are 
likely to have different sets of instances depending on which classification they belong to. 
Other examples of this same phenomenon include: 
 
 Certain adverse effects not elsewhere classified 
 Other prostate disorders 
 Female infertility of other origin 
 Unclassified epileptic seizures 
 Removal of other device from thorax 
 Toxic effect of other pesticides 
 
 To make matters worse, underspecification features are sometimes combined with terms 
created for the purpose of obtaining a complete partition, leading to class names which are 
(from the ontological perspective, at least) absurd, such as  
Other specified respiratory tuberculosis, not otherwise specified. 
 
 
5 Issues related to normality and to fiat boundaries 
 
Many classes found in biomedical vocabularies aim at representing not the reality of in-
stances to which the classification is applied, but rather the information as interpreted and 
used in some decision-making process (e.g., in the diagnosis of a disease). The fact in real-
ity might be, for example, that a given individual has a height of 4 feet (122 cm). The cor-
responding interpreted information is, in the context of a seven year-old boy: normal 
height, and in the context of an adult: dwarfism. The definition of normality for size (and 
for many other biological characteristics, such as visual acuity or the amount of 
hemoglobin per deciliter of whole blood) is determined statistically by reference to a 
population. The problem here is that normality is thus made relative to population, so that there are 
almost as many definitions of medical terms involving a normality component as there are 
populations. Average size, for example, is different in North America and in Asia. Addi-
tionally, in the case of size and hemoglobin, there are variations within a given population 
related to age and gender. In addition to varying across geographic regions, classes whose 
definitions are relative to a given population will also necessarily vary over time to reflect 
changes in this population. In other words, such classes will have different sets of instances 
depending on the part of the world and time in history considered.  
The normality of biological characteristics (and deviations therefrom) is central to the 
diagnostic process in medicine. Therefore, classes created to express abnormal findings are 
pervasive in biomedical vocabularies. Examples of such classes include Precocious pu-
berty, Enlarged liver, and Decreased libido. In some cases, the degree of abnormality is 
made precise, as in:  
 
 Cerebral spinal fluid protein increased, slight  
 Cerebral spinal fluid protein increased, marked. 
 
Beyond normality, this observation can be generalized to notions such as survivability of 
the fetus outside the womb at 32 weeks of gestation, whose variation over time and across 
geographical locations ranges almost from zero to 90% survival. 
 
 
6 Discussion 
 
Consider, in light of the above, the history of viral hepatitis [6]. Epidemic jaundice, 
now called hepatitis A, was known already to the Ancient Greeks. It is transmitted through 
infected feces. Another form of hepatitis is transmitted by contact with the blood of in-
fected patients, which is why it was named serum hepatitis before getting its current name: 
hepatitis B. Contamination after transfusion of contaminated blood was frequent before the 
mid-1970s, when blood banks started testing for the hepatitis A and B viruses which had 
been discovered a few years earlier. While the number of transfusion-transmitted hepatitis 
cases dropped dramatically with the initiation of such testing, the disease did not com-
pletely disappear. This observation led physicians to hypothesize that other hepatitis vi-
ruses may be responsible for these other cases, named non-A non-B hepatitis. The hepatitis 
C virus was discovered in the early 1990s, and additional D, E, F, and G hepatitis viruses 
have also been identified. Along the way, terms were crafted in order to name these dis-
eases relatively to what was known at the time, i.e., by exonerating known viruses from 
 causing the disease. In addition to non-A non-B hepatitis, names such as non-A non-B non-
C hepatitis and non-A non-B non-C non-D non-E hepatitis can be found in the literature, if 
not in biomedical terminology. 
While the terminology of hepatitis – in involving the use of names essentially reflect-
ing non-features rather than defining characteristics – is far from ideal, it has not caused 
classification problems. Each non-feature term can be thought of as the complement of 
other terms at a certain depth in the hierarchy. At a given level, the corresponding classes 
are jointly exhaustive and mutually exclusive. The first level under hepatitis consists of the 
three subclasses hepatitis A, hepatitis B, and non-A non-B hepatitis. In turn, non-A non-B 
hepatitis is subdivided into hepatitis C and non-A non-B non-C hepatitis. Although each 
kind of viral hepatitis is expected to be a direct subclass of hepatitis rather than being clas-
sified further down the hierarchy, an organization of this sort represents a viable if not ideal 
alternative. 
As a matter of fact, many examples of a similar classification scheme based on a par-
ticularly important binary distinction and its complement can be found in the biomedical 
domain, including: 
 
 Non-Hodgkin lymphoma 
 Non-invasive medical procedure 
 Non-opioid analgesics 
 Non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs 
 Non-insulin dependent diabetes mellitus 
 
Although these classes emphasize absent features (i.e., the features present in the comple-
ment class), we argue that they essentially correspond to valid, genuine classes for which 
no specific positive name or names have as yet been crafted. That we council the search for 
such positive names reflects our adherence to the so-called ‘sparse theory of universals’ [2], 
which argues that it is a mistake to suppose that we can use mere logical combinations to 
discover universals existing in reality. The needed positive denominations have indeed al-
ready been produced in the case of the subclasses of diabetes mellitus: Type I (for insulin 
dependent) diabetes mellitus and Type II (for non-insulin dependent) diabetes mellitus. In 
this case, however, the nomenclature based on numbering may still be considered less than 
fully adequate. 
It is important for a number of reasons that classes denoted by biomedical terms repre-
sent as closely as possible the genuine classes which exist in reality. Having variant names 
for the same class – names incorporating epistemological admixtures – may be acceptable 
(and possibly desirable) as long these terms do not cause confusion by being held to denote 
distinct classes. This is the case with the many examples of terms denoting the absence of 
association between two entities (e.g., Adenoidectomy without tonsillectomy, simply corre-
sponding to Adenoidectomy). Here, again, there is no special class in reality that is instanti-
ated by individual cases of Adenoidectomy without tonsillectomy. Certainly there are sets 
(in the mathematical sense) of the corresponding instances, but biomedical terminologies 
and the associated ontologies are interested not in purely contingent relations between sets 
of instances (as illustrated, for example, by a set-inclusion relation such as that between 
animal owned by the Emporer and mammal weighing less than 200 kg.) Rather, they are 
interested in those sorts of relations which are captured in scientific laws, and this means 
relations holding between genuine classes in reality [7]. 
Moreover, class names are often the primary (if not the sole) feature used for aligning 
biomedical vocabularies. Improper alignment of classes brought about by spurious naming 
conventions is thus likely to result in inadequate integration of the clinical and research da-
tabases in which these classes are contained. 
 
 
 7 Conclusions 
 
In this study, we analyze the epistemological features of biomedical terminology and 
their relations to ontological features. This study is therefore complementary to various 
other approaches developed to identify ontological distinctions, such as Guarino and 
Welty’s meta-properties [9] and Pustejovsky’s qualia structure [4]. Like these approaches, 
our analysis recognizes the necessity of making these distinctions explicit. In contrast, the 
influence of information and library sciences on terminology development often results in 
products in which such distinctions are, if not hidden, at least simply referred to as Ranga-
nathan’s “facets” [1]. In the future, we plan to develop a method for identifying epistemo-
logical features systematically and to refine the definition of genuine classes in biomedi-
cine. 
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